1. The richest group was Western Europe in 1820 and the "Euopean Offshoots" (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the U.S.) in 1998. The poorest group was Africa in both years.
2. In what follows "convergence" is defined in this sense, to mean convergence in growth rates. Although the neoclassical growth model with instantaneous technology transfer exhibits convergence in growth rates, nevertheless the concept is not the same as the more familiar "conditional convergence," which means (Galor 1996) that countries with the same characteristics converge to the same growth path. For example, in the case of multiple steady states of the sort illustrated in Figure 3 below, countries with the same characteristics but different initial conditions could converge to different growth paths but with the same growth rate. Conversely, in a model of conditional convergence, countries with one set of characteristics could all converge to a growth path that was not parallel to the common asymptotic path of countries with a different set of characteristics.
3. See Baumol (1986) , Durlauf and Johnson (1995) , Quah (1993 Quah ( , 1997 , and Mayer-Foulkes (2002 .
4. See also Knight, Loayza, and Villanueva (1993) , Islam (1995) , Caselli, Esquivel, and Lefort (1996) , Prescott (1998) , Hall and Jones (1999), and Feyrer (2001). differences that takes technology transfer into account implies that all countries share the same long-run growth rate, including those in which technologies developed on the frontier are not "appropriate" for poorer countries (Basu and Weil, 1998, Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001) , those in which technology transfer can be blocked by local special interests Prescott, 1994, 1999) and those in which a country adopts institutions that do not permit full advantage to be taken of technology transfer (Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti, 2002) . None of them can therefore explain how a country's growth rate could remain significantly below that of the rest of the world for almost two centuries.
So what force was opposing technology transfer so as to produce the technological divergence that took place over the longer period from the early 19th Century, and which to some extent still remains? And why did that force stop working for a large group of countries during the second half of the 20th Century, but not for the poorest countries? 5 The purpose of this paper is to address these questions using modern innovation-based growth theory.
We take a variant of the Aghion-Howitt (1992 , 1998 ) model of growth, in which international technology transfer takes place in just the same way as cross-industry technology spillovers, and show that in this model technology transfer is not always strong enough to keep all countries growing at the same rate in the long run. In particular, countries in which parameter values are sufficiently favorable to innovation will all converge to the same frontier growth rate (which is endogenously determined in the model) but others will grow at a strictly lower rate that depends on local parameter values. We go on to show that this model provides an account of the great divergence and recent club-convergence.
There are three key components of our argument. The first is that technology transfer is a difficult, skill-intensive process. The receiving country cannot just take foreign technologies off the shelf and implement them costlessly. Instead, the country must make technology investments of its own to master foreign technologies and adapt them to the local environment, because technological knowledge is often tacit and circumstantially specific. 6 Although in some countries these investments may not involve scientists and high tech labs, and hence would not fit the conventional definition of R&D, nevertheless they play much the same role as R&D in an innovation-based growth model. That is, they generate new technological possibilities in the country where they are conducted, building on knowledge that was created previously elsewhere. As Cohen and Levinthal (1989) and Griffith, Redding, and Van Reenen (2001) have argued, each act of technology transfer requires an innovation on the part of the receiving country, and thus, R&D or more generally technology investment is a necessary input to the process of technology transfer.
By integrating technology transfer into an innovation-based growth model where the innovation process is skill-intensive we are building a theory of what Nelson 5. Except for a small number of formerly poor "miracle" countries such as Botswana, China, Mauritius, and the East Asian NICs.
6. See Arrow (1969) or Evenson and Westphal (1995) .
and Phelps (1966) called "absorptive capacity." In the original Nelson-Phelps model, absorptive capacity was assumed to be a function of human capital. Our theory represents an attempt to open the black box of that function by linking it to the broader theory of innovation-based growth.
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The second key component is the assumption that a country's stock of "effective skills" that can be used in innovation depends on its level of development, relative to the global technological frontier from which it draws new ideas. There are two parts to this component. The first is a human capital externality of the sort now familiar in growth theory. That is, a given time input into schooling/training will produce fewer effective skills in a country that is technologically backward, because learning takes place in an environment where modern technology is relatively unfamiliar, teachers are not as well versed in modern techniques, classrooms and labs are less up-to-date, and so forth. The second part is an effect of increasing complexity and "fishing out." That is, as the global technology frontier advances and becomes more complex a country needs to keep increasing its skill levels just in order to keep pace with the frontier. Because of the combination of the human capital externality and the fishing-out effect, a country that does not keep pace with the frontier will find it increasingly difficult to catch up, because its absorptive capacity will erode. This erosion of absorptive capacity in technological laggards is a central part of our explanation of long-term divergence.
The third key component is a hypothesis that the main driving force behind both the great divergence and the recent club-convergence was the growth of a new set of scientific ideas and attitudes associated with the scientific revolution, what Crosby (1997) calls a quantitative, analytical "mentalité." The rise of modern economic growth starting with the first Industrial Revolution was closely associated with these ideas and attitudes.
8 A new perspective of nature founded on scientific achievements, sustaining ever deeper advances of knowledge, brought about a new era of technological change. This movement culminated in the late 19th Century with the introduction of the modern R&D lab, which exploited the growing interconnections between science and technology, and the rise of various institutions such as government research labs and agencies, scientific academies, universities with close ties to industry and commerce, and so forth.
9 But it started much earlier, well before the modern R& D lab became an important force.
In order to integrate this force into our analysis we model it as the introduction of a new method for technological change, which we call "modern R&D," or for 7. See Foster and Rosenzweig (1996) and Griffith, Redding, and Van Reenen (2001) for evidence that skills are an important determinant of a country's absorptive capacity. Benhabib and Spiegel (2002) also find that convergence-club membership is well explained by differences in human capital.
8. See Jacob (1997) and Mokyr (2002) . 9. Edison's research lab in Menlo Park, generally considered the first modern "invention factory," opened in 1876. Rosenberg and Birdzell (1986, ch. 8 ) provide a brief account of the rise of the modern R&D lab and the increasing interconnectedness between science and technology, which they argue began around 1875. Mowery and Rosenberg (1998, ch. 2) and Wright (1999) argue that a network of linkages between universities, government agencies and commercial enterprises played a key role in establishing America's technological leadership in many fields.
short just "R&D." For simplicity we suppose that instead of diffusing gradually the new method was introduced discontinuously at a single point in time. Before this, we assume that all technological changes took the form of a pragmatic creativity that we call "implementation." R&D is what goes on in the most technologically advanced countries, while implementation is the process of assimilation and adaptation that still takes place in less advanced countries. We suppose that both kinds of technology investments are costly and skill intensive, and both draw on the world's technology frontier, but R&D draws more heavily on scientific knowledge, and thus, requires higher skill levels than implementation. In particular, graduating from implementation to R&D requires surpassing a threshold skill level that increases with the demands of new, ever advancing, leading technologies.
First, we lay out our model and solve it for the dynamics of productivity differences and of the world growth rate, showing the conditions needed for a country to converge to the growth rate of the global technology frontier. We then show how the model can replicate the great divergence and the recent club-convergence as a response to a single event, namely the introduction of modern R&D at some time t 0 . In the model this event leads to a trifurcation of countries, creating three distinct convergence groups. A sketch of our argument goes as follows.
Suppose that before t 0 all countries were on parallel growth paths, with some level-differences attributable to differences in country-specific parameters. Figure 1 depicts the evolution of productivity in three countries, one in each convergence group. Country A has the "best" parameter values (i.e. those most favorable to innovation) and country C the worst. After t 0 only those countries whose productivity level exceed some critical values will have a skilled enough labor force to begin using modern R&D immediately. (In Figure 1 this is only country A.) Those that do will start growing faster as a result of using the more productive (R&D) method of technology investment. All others will continue using implementation, and will start to fall further behind country A.
As the other countries fall further behind, technology transfer will start to pull their growth rates up, but until their growth rates have caught up with the growth rate of the frontier, the erosion of absorptive capacity engendered by their increasing technological backwardness will tend to weaken the force of technology transfer. In countries that are not too far behind to start with, absorptive capacity will remain strong enough to eventually put them on growth paths parallel to that of country A, but with a permanently bigger gap in productivity levels, as in the case of country B; the initial gap that was due to different parameter values is now amplified by the fact that country A has adopted modern R&D while country B has not. But if the country starts too far behind (as with country C) then the erosion of absorptive capacity will weaken the force of technology transfer to such an extent that, although the country will continue to grow forever, its asymptotic growth rate will be strictly less than the common long-run growth rate of countries A and B.
As in the historical record, the dominant long-run pattern in Figure 1 is a great divergence-a widening in the distribution of the cross-country distribution of productivity-but the dominant pattern in the most recent era is club-convergence, with countries like A and B all growing at some common rate and the poorest countries like C growing more slowly.
The model we use is somewhat similar to the multi-country growth model of Howitt (2000) , which also generates a form of club-convergence. The difference is that the earlier model did not represent innovation as being skill-intensive, and did not allow for different methods of technology investment (implementation and R&D). 10 The earlier model could only create a limited form of club-convergence, in which one group of countries grows at the same rate as the global technology frontier while others (who are in a corner solution doing no R&D) do not grow at all.
11 Moreover in the earlier model the introduction of modern R&D could not create divergence if there was none to begin with. This is because the crucial effect by which an acceleration of the global technology frontier erodes the absorptive capacity of a laggard depends on the assumption that innovation is skill intensive, which assumption is missing from the earlier model.
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A very different approach to understanding the broad facts of divergence and convergence is to see convergence as the only possibility in the long run. Thus, for example Lucas (2000) believes that the great divergence is a transitory phenomenon, arising from the fact that different countries have made the transition to modern economic growth at different points in time. Those who made the transition earliest 10. Only a small handful of rich countries perform leading-edge R&D. In 1996, for example, five countries accounted for over 80% of the world's formal R&D expenditures, and 11 countries accounted for over 95%.
11. Absolute stagnation by the laggards is also counterfactual, because not even those countries at the bottom of the distribution have been completely stagnant technologically. According to Maddison's (2001) tables, per-capita income in the poorest group of countries (Africa) grew by 60% from 1950 to 1998.
12. The recent model of Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-Foulkes (2004) provides a similar analysis of convergence clubs based on financial constraints rather than skill levels. pulled ahead of the others, but one by one the others are joining the growth club. Eventually when all countries have made the transition they will all be once more on parallel growth paths. According to this view, joining the growth club is just a matter of adopting the kinds of policies and institutions that would make a country able to benefit from technology transfer and thus, eligible to join the modern growth club.
This viewpoint, which we suspect is held by many macroeconomists, contrasts with ours on several points. First, it is not based on an explicit model of technology transfer that can explain what kind of "transition" is needed and why a country's long-run growth rate must be less than that of the world's technology leaders before the transition occurs despite the convergence-inducing effect of technology transfer, whereas we build our account on an explicit model of endogenous technology transfer. Second, we find it more persuasive to characterize the last two centuries of history as the long run rather than "transitory." Third, our account is more parsimonious, in the sense that it depends on a single global event, to which different countries responded differently, depending on their parameters and initial conditions and depending on each other's reactions, rather than relying on a sequence of independent shocks, each initiating a "transition" of a different country.
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The fourth point of contrast is that our account implies a path-dependency that is missing from the "transitory divergence" viewpoint. In our account there is nothing automatic about technology transfer that would ensure convergence if some institutional or policy barrier was simply removed. On the contrary, whether or not a country converges will depend not only on its policies and institutions but also on historically predetermined initial conditions. That is, the dynamics of productivity growth in any given country may exhibit multiple steady states. We illustrate this below by showing that a country that is not in the highest convergence club, doing modern R&D, may have only a finite window of opportunity in which to join that club by changing its policies and/or institutions, after which it will be too late to join even if it mimics the policies and institutions of countries that are already in the club.
Our account is consistent with the dynamical features observed by Feyrer (2001) who notes that Quah's (1993 Quah's ( , 1997 finding of "twin peaks" emerging in the distribution of world income is mainly attributable to diverging total factor productivity rather than diverging capital accumulation or education. (We abstract completely from capital accumulation, and time spent in education is assumed constant in each country.) As Feyrer notes, models constructing development traps based on multiple equilibria in physical or human capital accumulation (such as Becker and Barro, 1989 , Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1989 , Azariadis and Drazen, 1990 , Becker, Murphy, and Tamura, 1990 , Tsiddon, 1992 , Galor and Zeira, 1993 , Durlauf, 1993 , Zilibotti, 1995 , Galor and Weil, 1996 , Bénabou, 1996 , and Galor and Tsiddon, 1997 are inconsistent with this observation.
Section 1 below lays out our basic model, under the assumption that there is just one method for investing in technological change. It uses this model to analyze the determinants of the world growth rate and of each country's relative productivity, both in and out of steady state, before the introduction of modern R&D. Section 2 then shows what happens if we start in the steady state and introduce modern R& D, assuming that some countries can use the new method but some lack the necessary skill levels. It shows how countries sort themselves into the three convergence groups depicted in Figure 1 . Section 3 then analyzes the role of initial conditions in determining long-run group membership and creating windows of opportunity. Section 4 contains our concluding remarks.
THE BASIC MODEL
We analyze a simple multi-country innovation-based growth model, in which innovations in any country require private inputs, in the form of materials and entrepreneurial skills, and a public input in the form of the world-wide stock of technological knowledge, whose value at each date t is Ā t . Innovations also feed back into this stock of knowledge, making the global growth rate g t ≡ (Ā tϩ1 Ϫ Ā t )/Ā t proportional to the rate of innovation in leading countries. Countries are thus connected through the shared stock of knowledge Ā t . For simplicity we ignore all other connections, by assuming that countries do not exchange products or factors of production with each other. We begin by analyzing an isolated country, in which there is just one method of innovation; that is, before the introduction of modern R&D. To help the reader follow the analytical derivation the following table lists the variables used, in the order that they will be introduced.
Preferences and Production
There is a unit mass of people. Each lives for two periods, and is endowed with two units of labor services in the first period of life and none in the second. 14 Everyone's utility function is linear in consumption: U ϭ c 1 ϩ (1/(1 ϩ ρ))c 2 . Saving is taxed at the rate τ, so the equilibrium rate of interest will be ρ(1 Ϫ τ) and the discount factor applied in all present value calculations will be β ϭ 1/(1 ϩ ρ(1 Ϫ τ)). We interpret β as reflecting the policies and institutions governing the incentive to save, including the security of contracts and property rights.
There is a single general good, produced by specialized intermediate goods, according to the production function:
where L is labor input, ψ is a parameter representing the effects of such nontechnological factors as geography, institutions, and policies that influence a 14. A similar overlapping-generations framework is also used by Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2002) . Our 2002 NBER working paper (Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes, 2002 ) contains a more general continuous-time analysis with infinitely-lived people. country's total factor productivity, x t (i) is the country's input of intermediate good i and A t (i) is the country-specific technological productivity parameter associated with it. The general good is used for consumption, as an input to R&D, and also as an input to the production of intermediate goods.
Producers of the general good act as perfect competitors in all markets, so the equilibrium price of each intermediate good is its marginal product in producing the general good:
(we use the general good as numéraire, and in equilibrium L ϭ 1.) For each intermediate good i there is a large number of firms capable of producing any given amount, using as the only input χ units of general good per unit of output, where 1 Ͻ χ Ͻ α Ϫ1 . In addition, as a result of the innovation process to be described in the next section, in some intermediate sectors there will be a single producer (called the "incumbent") who can produce any amount using only one unit of general good per unit of output. All intermediate producers compete in prices à la Bertrand, so the equilibrium price will equal the unit cost of the second most efficient producer:
Solving Equations (2) and (3) for the equilibrium quantity x t (i) we see that the profit earned by the incumbent in any intermediate sector i will be proportional to the productivity parameter in that sector:
Substituting the equilibrium quantities x t (i) into the production function (Equation 1) shows that the equilibrium output of the general good will be proportional to the aggregate productivity parameter:
Therefore, the growth rate of aggregate output will be the growth rate of aggregate productivity:
Our main objective in what follows is to determine whether the country's growth rate G t converges to the global growth rate g t .
Entrepreneurial Skills, Technology Transfer and Innovation
In each intermediate sector i there is one person born each period t who is capable of producing an innovation for the next period. This person is called the "entrepreneur" in sector i. During the first period of her life, she obtains a skill level S t and carries out research to innovate. If she succeeds (innovates) then she will be the ith incumbent in period t ϩ 1, and she will get to monopolize the market for intermediate good i with a technology parameter A tϩ1 (i) that embodies the worldwide stock of knowledge. For simplicity we assume that parameter equals Ā tϩ1 , henceforth called the "global frontier," which is the same for all sectors and all countries.
The probability that an entrepreneur innovates is given by:
where λ is a parameter representing the productivity of the innovation technology and z t is the quantity of general good she invests in the form of material inputs to the innovation process. We divide by the targeted technology level Ā tϩ1 to recognize the "fishing out" effect; the more advanced the technology the more difficult it is to innovate. This effect is crucial in what follows. Entrepreneurial skills are produced by two inputs: time and local knowledge. We take as given the amount of time spent in education by each entrepreneur.
16 Local knowledge is a public input which we assume to be proportional to aggregate 16 . This time is not subtracted from the aggregate labor supply L because entrepreneurs are assumed for simplicity to constitute a zero-measure subset of all people. Endogenizing the choice of education time as we did in our 2002 NBER working paper produces no new insights. productivity A t , reflecting a human capital spillover of the sort that is now familiar in the growth literature. That is, time spent acquiring skills is more productive in a technologically more advanced economy where there is more to learn from others. Thus, each entrepreneur attains a skill level:
where the schooling parameter ξ is "effective education time"-the product of schooling years and quality. In equilibrium the innovation probability µ t will be the same in all sectors. It will be chosen so as to maximize each entrepreneur's expected net payoff:
where φ ʦ (0,1) is the rate at which technology investment is subsidized. The parameter φ is a proxy for all distortions and policies that impinge directly on the incentive to innovate. It can be negative, in which case the distortions and policies favoring innovation are outweighed by those discouraging it.
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The resulting equilibrium innovation rate can be expressed, using Equation (6) to substitute for entrepreneurial skills, as:
where a t is the country's "normalized productivity":
and the parameter µ is:
To ensure that the probability of innovation is less than unity we assume parameter values are always such that µ Ͻ 1.
According to Equation (8) the country's innovation rate µ t is proportional to its normalized productivity. This is because of the fishing-out effect in the innovation process and the human capital externality in skill formation. Because of fishing out, the level of entrepreneurial skill required to innovate at any given rate in equilibrium is strictly proportional to the global frontier Ā t , but because the human capital externality is a local one the actual level of entrepreneurial skill is only proportional to local productivity A t . Therefore, the larger is the normalized productivity A t րĀ t the greater the country's entrepreneurial skill level will be relative to the amount needed
17. An increase in φ can be thought of as a reduction of the "barriers to adoption" stressed by Prescott (1994, 1999) , because technology transfer and innovation are all part of the same process in this model. to innovate at any given rate. We refer to this positive effect of normalized productivity on a country's innovation rate as the "absorption effect" because it works by altering the country's capacity to absorb global technological knowledge.
Since a t is an inverse measure of the country's distance to the global technology frontier, the absorption effect implies a disadvantage of backwardness. That is, the further the country is from the frontier the lower will be the frequency with any given intermediate sector catches up to the global frontier. The absorption effect is important in determining whether or not the country converges, because it acts as a counterforce to Gerschenkron's (1952) more familiar advantage of backwardness, which is that the further behind the frontier the country is, the bigger is the jump in productivity expected to take place with each innovation.
The term 1 ϩ g t in the denominator of Equation (8) reflects the fact that local skills are proportional to local productivity this period whereas the skill level required to innovate at any rate depend on the global frontier next period. Thus, any increase in the frontier growth rate g t means a reduction in the effectiveness of a country's entrepreneurial skills, and hence in its absorptive capacity, at any given distance from the current frontier.
The parameter µ in Equation (8) is a measure of the country's "competitiveness," in the sense that a larger value of µ means a higher rate of innovation for any given initial condition.
18 According to Equation (9), competitiveness is enhanced by any increase in the productivity of the innovation process (λ), the incentive to innovate (φ), the incentive to save (β) or the quality or quantity of education (ξ). Using Equation (4) to substitute for the profit parameter π in Equation (9) we see that competitiveness is also greater, ceteris paribus, in countries where geography, policies, and institutions would tend to make productivity higher even if they did not affect the innovation process (i.e. countries where ψ is higher).
Productivity Dynamics
The productivity parameter A t (i) in each sector evolves according to:
with probability µ t A t (i) with probability 1 Ϫ µ t } .
The average level A t therefore obeys:
(10) Subtracting A t from each side, we have:
( 1 1 ) where ∆ is the forward difference operator.
18. We call this "competitiveness" to recognize the Schumpeterian viewpoint, expressed in modern terms by Porter (1990) , to the effect that innovation is the main form of competition in a free-enterprise market economy.
Like the analogous equation (8) of Nelson and Phelps (1966) , Equation (11) expresses the change in productivity as the product of a technology gap (Ā tϩ1 Ϫ A t ) and a coefficient that we can interpret as "absorptive capacity." Nelson and Phelps assumed that absorptive capacity was a given function of human capital, whereas in our theory absorptive capacity equals the endogenous rate of innovation, which will turn out to depend on domestic skills. Equation (11) also illustrates Gerschenkron's advantage of backwardness-the larger the technology gap separating the country from the frontier the larger will be the rate of domestic productivity growth, given the degree of absorptive capacity. As we shall see, the fact that absorptive capacity is not given means that Gerschenkron's advantage is not always enough to guarantee convergence.
Dividing both sides of Equation (10) by Ā tϩ1 we see that:
Equation (12) shows how Gerschenkron's advantage of backwardness would produce convergence in the absence of the absorption effect. For suppose that the local innovation rate was constant, with µ t ϭ µ * Ͼ 0. Assume for simplicity that the frontier growth rate is also constant, with g t ϭ g * Ͼ 0. Then according to Equation (12) normalized productivity would converge to a unique long-run equilibrium value a * ϭ µ * ((1 ϩ g * )/(µ * ϩ g * )) Ͼ 0, implying that in the long run the country's productivity (the numerator of a t ϭ A t րĀ t ) would grow at the same rate as the global frontier (the denominator of a t ). However, the absorption effect, according to which µ t is proportional to a t rather than constant, creates a countervailing disadvantage of backwardness, which implies that convergence will depend on the country's competitiveness parameter µ instead of being guaranteed. To analyze the conditions under which convergence will or will not occur, we focus on the following two equations.
First, replacing the innovation rate in Equation (12) by its equilibrium value [Equation (8)] yields the law of motion for normalized productivity:
Next, using Equation (13) and the fact that, by construction, 1 ϩ G t ϭ A tϩ1 /A t ϭ (a tϩ1 /a t )(1 ϩ g t ), we see that the country's growth rate G t depends negatively on its normalized productivity, according to an equation reminiscent of those frequently estimated in cross-country growth regressions:
(14)
A follower country. Consider first a follower country that has no influence over the frontier growth rate g t . Suppose that g t converges to a limiting value g * Ͼ 0 in the long run. (In the next section we show that this is indeed implied by the model.)
Then the long-run behavior of the country's normalized productivity will be governed by the asymptotic limit of the law of motion [Equation (13)]:
It is easy to verify that the right-hand side of Equation (15) is an increasing and concave function of a t on the unit interval, equal to zero when a t ϭ 0 and less than 1 when a t ϭ 1. As shown in the two panels of Figure 2 , this implies that there exists a unique long-run equilibrium value to which normalized productivity will converge from any initial position.
The country's long-run normalized productivity depends on the asymptotic frontier growth rate g * and on the country's competitiveness µ. An increase in the frontier growth rate will make it harder for the country to keep up with the frontier, both because sectors that do not innovate will fall even faster relative to the growing frontier and also because, as pointed out above in the discussion surrounding Equation (8), an increase in global growth will reduce the fraction µ t of sectors that do innovate by reducing the effectiveness of entrepreneurial skills at any given current distance from the frontier. For both of these reasons the increase in g * will shift the Φ curve down in Figure 1 , 19 thereby reducing the country's long-run normalized 19. Formally, we have:
productivity. On the other hand, an increase in the country's competitiveness will raise the innovation rate in any given situation, thus resulting in an upward shift of the Φ curve 20 and an increase in the country's long-run normalized productivity. More specifically, if µ Ͼ g * then the unique stable steady state of the law of motion [Equation (15)] is:
which depends negatively on g * and positively on µ. This is the case shown in panel A of Figure 2 . Substituting a t ϭ a * into the growth Equation (14) above verifies that the country's productivity growth rate G t will equal g * in this steady state.
However, if µ Ͻ g * then there is no positive steady-state normalized productivity. In this case, as shown in panel B of Figure 2 , the slope of the Φ curve will be less than unity everywhere, and normalized productivity will fall asymptotically to zero. According to the growth Equation (14) above the country's long-run growth rate will equal µ, the value of its competitiveness parameter.
In the borderline case where µ ϭ g * the only steady stage is a * ϭ 0, and the growth Equation (14) implies that the country's long-run growth rate will equal the frontier growth rate g * .
These results are formalized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1: Long-run growth and normalized productivity in a follower country. (i) If
lim t→∞ a t ϭ 0 and lim t→∞ G t ϭ µ.
The Frontier Growth Rate
Suppose for simplicity that there is just one leading country, labeled country 1, whose innovations affect the evolution of the global stock of knowledge Ā t . Everything that was assumed above of a follower country is true also of country 1. Thus, its rate of innovation µ 1 t depends on its competitiveness parameter µ 1 and its normalized productivity a 1 t according to the same Equation (8) as in a follower country:
The only difference between country 1 and the others is that the global frontier depends on the rate of innovation µ 1 t in country 1, according to:
where σ Ͼ 0 is a spillover coefficient.
These last two equations solve for the frontier growth rate as a function of the leader's normalized productivity:
The function g is increasing in a 1 t . Intuitively this is because an increase in the leader's normalized productivity will increase its innovation rate, through the absorption effect analyzed above, and this increase in its innovation rate will in turn cause the frontier technology to grow more rapidly.
The function g(a 1 t ) is also concave, the intuitive explanation for which is as follows. As the leader's normalized productivity a 1 t rises, then because the innovation technology [Equation (5)] exhibits constant returns to scale, the innovation rate µ 1 t would rise in proportion to the rise in a 1 t if the frontier growth rate g t were held constant, as indicated by the reduced-form Equation (16). However, this rise in the leader's innovation rate will in fact cause the frontier growth rate to increase, through the spillover Equation (17). This increase in the frontier growth rate diminishes the effectiveness of the leader's entrepreneurial skills by increasing the distance between the leader's current productivity and the future productivity that its entrepreneurs are targeting, as pointed out in our discussion surrounding Equation (8) above. This reduced effectiveness of entrepreneurial skills will dampen the rise in the leader's innovation rate, making it less than proportional to the increase in a 1 t . Since Equation (17) makes the frontier growth rate proportional to the leader's innovation rate, therefore the overall increase in g t will also be less than proportional increase to the increase in a 1 t . Normalized productivity in country 1 obeys the same law of motion (Equation 13) as in a follower country. Substituting from Equation (18) into this law of motion yields the reduced-form law of motion:
The function Λ(a 1 t ) on the right-hand side of Equation (19) is increasing and concave, with Λ′ (0) Ͼ 1, Λ (0) ϭ 0, and Λ (1) Ͻ 1. 21 Therefore, the leader's normalized productivity will approach a unique long-run value monotonically over time.
Proof: Define
Because g is increasing and concave on the unit interval, therefore so is h. Also, by construction:
Because g solves Equations (16) and (17), the right-hand side of Equation (19) can be expressed as:
This result, together with Equation (18), which makes the frontier growth rate an increasing function of the leader's normalized productivity, implies that the frontier growth rate converges monotonically to its long-run value g * . More formally we have:
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Proposition 2: Global growth and the leader's normalized productivity. The leader's normalized productivity converges monotonically to:
and the frontier growth rate converges monotonically to:
where µ 1 is the leader's competitiveness parameter. Because Equations (9) and (4) must hold for the leader as well as for all other countries, the leader's competitiveness parameter equals:
and its profitability parameter π 1 equals:
and
22. To derive the expression for g * in Proposition 2, note that by the definition of a 1* :
therefore:
Since a 1* and g * satisfy Equations (16) and (17):
Therefore:
from which:
To derive the expression for a 1 * , use Equation (26) to replace g * in Equation (25).
These two equations and Proposition 2 together imply that the frontier growth rate depends positively on attributes of the leading country such as the various geographic, institutional, and policy factors underlying its efficiency parameter (ψ 1 ), its incentives to save (β 1 ) and to innovate (θ 1 ), and the quality/quantity of its education (ξ 1 ). These results are familiar from closed-economy innovation-based growth theory (Aghion and Howitt 1998) .
THE INTRODUCTION OF MODERN R&D
We model the introduction of modern R&D by supposing that before some date t 0 all productivity advances were based on a pragmatic creativity occurring close to the production process, which we call implementation, with innovation-productivity λ. Thereafter, an alternative method of technology investment, called R&D, became available to all countries. R&D produces innovations according to the same process as implementation, using the technology described by Equation (5) above, but with an innovation-productivity λ′ Ͼ λ.
To be viable, however, the new technology requires entrepreneurs to possess a skill level at least equal to some threshold value γĀ t , which depends upon the global technology frontier. If entrepreneurs do not have this threshold level of skills then R&D is impossible, although the original process of implementation remains. Because the entrepreneurial skill in any country is ξA t ϭ ξa t Ā t , therefore R&D will be possible in the country if its normalized productivity a t ϭ A t րĀ t is at least equal to the critical value:
Because R&D is the same as implementation except for its higher innovationproductivity, and because an entrepreneur's expected payoff in any given situation depends positively on her innovation-productivity, 23 all technology investment will take the form of R&D in countries where normalized productivity is at least equal to a c . A country with normalized productivity less than a c will lack the absorptive capacity needed to perform R&D, and all technology investment in the country will take the form of implementation.
Suppose that before the introduction of R&D the frontier growth rate was at its steady-state value g * , which was low enough that every country had a strictly positive steady-state normalized productivity. According to Proposition 1 above this just requires g * to be less than the competitiveness parameter µ of every country.
23. According to Equation (7) her expected payoff is:
Suppose also that each country was at its steady state. Then just before t 0 all countries will be on parallel growth paths, with a relatively low growth rate, as depicted in Figure 1 above.
At the time that R&D is introduced, each country's normalized productivity will equal its previous steady-state value a * . Thus, the country will engage immediately in R&D if and only if a * ≥ γ/ξ; according to Proposition 1 this is equivalent to the condition:
which requires the country to have a large enough combination of competitiveness (µ) and educational attainment (ξ). Assume that this condition is satisfied by the leader country. Then the evolution of the frontier growth rate following t 0 can be analyzed as follows.
The Rise in Global Growth
Again, g t will be proportional to the leader's innovation rate, which will be determined as before, but with the new innovation-productivity λ′ whenever the leader's normalized productivity exceeds a c , and the old innovation-productivity λ otherwise. Because the leader starts using R&D at t 0 , Equation (20) implies that its competitiveness parameter µ 1 will immediately increase to
at t 0 . According to Proposition 2 this means that as long as it continues to use R&D (so that its competitiveness parameter remains equal to µ 1 ′) its normalized productivity a 1 t will rise monotonically to the new steady-state value. But this means that the country will indeed continue to use R&D, because a 1 t will continue to exceed the critical value a c . The fact that the leader is now using a more effective method of technology investment will also lead to a steady increase in the growth rate of the global technology frontier. More formally, according to the updated version of Equation (18) above, the frontier growth rate from t 0 on will be:
which implies that the increase in the leader's competitiveness from µ 1 to µ 1 ′ will result in an immediate increase in g t at t 0 , even before a 1 t starts to rise. The subsequent monotonic rise in a 1 t will cause a further monotonic rise in the frontier growth rate from then on, since ĝ is an increasing function. According to Proposition 2 the new steady-state frontier growth rate will be: 
Sorting into Convergence Groups
Starting at t 0 , countries will sort into three convergence groups, depending on their initial (pre-R&D) competitiveness parameters µ and their educational attainment parameters ξ. Each follower country will start at a t 0 ϭ a * , the pre-R&D steady state, and will behave exactly as before but with a new sequence of frontier growth rates, and with the new higher competitiveness parameter at each date when it qualifies to perform R&D. That is, replacing the old innovation-productivity λ in Equation (9) above by its new value λ′ yields the new competitiveness parameter for a country performing R&D:
Thus, its productivity parameter will obey a modified version of the law of motion (Equation 13) above, namely:
. (22) where μ is the step-function:
Group 1-R&D. Consider first all countries which, like the leader, start with sufficient skill levels to perform R&D at t 0 . As shown in the previous section, these are the countries satisfying Condition (21) above. Like the leader, these countries will all experience a monotonic rise in normalized productivity and in the frequency of innovation, continuing forever to satisfy the criterion for performing R&D, and converging to what we call an R&D steady state.
This can be seen with the aid of Figure 3 below, in which the Φ 0 curve depicts the original asymptotic law of motion (Equation 13 ) that the country was obeying before t 0 . The discontinuous curve Φ ϩ 0 in Figure 3 represents the new law of motion (Equation 22) at date t 0 , and the discontinuous curve Φ ∞ represents the new asymptotic law of motion, which is Equation (22) with g t ϭ g′, the new steady-state growth rate. For now, consider just the continuous segment of each curve to the right of a c . In this region each curve is increasing, concave, and below the 45Њ line when a t ϭ 1, for the same reasons as before.
If the country performs R&D forever then its new steady-state normalized productivity will be the unique positive steady-state solution to Equation (15) with µ′ and g′ replacing µ and g * , namely the "R&D steady state": 
Because g′րg * ϭ µ′րµ * ϭ (λ′րλ) 1րη Ͼ 1, therefore this new steady-state normalized productivity is greater than the pre-R&D steady state a * :
This implies that the new asymptotic curve Φ ∞ must lie above the original steady state in Figure 3 . Moreover, as g t rises monotonically to g′ this causes the curve representing the law of motion (Equation 22 ) in this segment to shift down monotonically, 24 as shown in Figure 3 . It follows that a t will remain to the right of a c forever and will converge asymptotically to a′ R . Because a′ R Ͼ a c Ͼ 0 it follows that the country will indeed perform R&D forever, and that its asymptotic growth rate will equal the asymptotic global rate g′.
Groups 2 and 3-implementation and stagnation. Now consider all countries which, unlike the leader, start without sufficient skill levels to perform R&D at t 0 . These countries fail to satisfy Condition (21) above. Such a country will never be able to perform R&D, and will remain performing implementation forever. 25 Whether 24. See Note 19 above. 25. We ignore the possibility that the country could try using the new method aimed at a productivity parameter B tϩ1 Ͻ Ā tϩ1 with lower skill requirements, targeting what was the frontier some time in the past. One reason why this possibility might not work is that to make use of R&D a researcher must be be plugged into a global community that is no longer interested in discussing the old frontier. If we were to allow the possibility then instead of a country in group 2 or 3 fallling behind because of a smaller frequency of innovations it would start falling behind because of a smaller size. We leave a more complete analysis for future research.
or not its growth rate converges to the new asymptotic global rate g′ will depend on the size of its competitiveness parameter µ, which remains unchanged at the value given by Equation (9) above. If the country is sufficiently competitive then it will converge to a steady state with the frontier growth rate g′, but otherwise it will converge to a strictly lower growth rate that depends positively on its competitiveness.
This can be seen with the aid of Figure 4 below, in which curves have the same interpretation as in Figure 3 . This time we consider just the parts to the left of a c . Because the country retains the same competitiveness parameter as before in this region, the only thing shifting the Φ curve in Figure 4 over time is the monotonic increase in global growth, which shifts the curve monotonically down.
26 By assumption this country begins to the left of a c . The downward shift of the Φ curve will therefore drive it further to the left. Intuitively, the acceleration in the global frontier is leaving the country increasingly behind, and the fact that it is not able to take advantage of the new method of technological change means that its growth rate will not start to rise until the gap separating it from the frontier has risen, giving it an advantage of backwardness.
The asymptotic behavior of this country will be governed by exactly the same process as we analyzed in Section 1 above, except with a new higher asymptotic frontier growth rate g′ Ͼ g * . It follows then from Proposition 1 that if µ ≥ g′ the country will converge to a new "implementation steady state":
with a growth rate equal to g′. This is the case shown in Figure 4 . It also follows from Proposition 1 that if µ Ͻ g′ then the country will converge to a "stagnation steady state" in which normalized productivity is zero and the country's growth rate equals its competitiveness parameter µ. In Figure 4 such a country would have an asymptotic law of motion represented by a curve Φ ∞ whose slope was strictly less than unity everywhere to the left of a c .
Club-Convergence and the Great Divergence
The above results imply that following the introduction of R&D, when countries eventually approach their new steady states, there will be one group of "converging" countries, namely those approaching either an R&D steady state or an implementation steady state, all growing asymptotically at the same frontier rate g′. All other countries will diverge, each approaching a stagnation steady state with a growth rate that depends on local parameters and is strictly less than the frontier growth rate g′. This is the pattern of club-convergence that seems to be have been exhibited by the historical record since the mid-20th Century. Formally we have:
Proposition 4: Eventual club-convergence following the introduction of modern R&D. For all countries such that (1 ϩ g * )(1 Ϫ g * րµ) ≥ γրξ or µ ≥ g′, lim t→∞ G t ϭ g′, and for all other countries,
This proposition is neutral with respect to the recent debate concerning the relative effects of institutions and geography on growth. 27 For it implies that the growth rate of an economy that grows at less than the frontier rate g′ in the long run will depend on geographic factors underlying the efficiency parameter ψ, but also on the institutions (and policies) that affect the incentives to save (β) and to innovate (θ), the quality/quantity of education (ξ) and efficiency (ψ). This is because, according to Equations (4) and (9), all of these factors have a positive effect on the country's competitiveness parameter µ. For the same reason, according to Equations (23) and (24) all of these factors will affect the steady-state levels of productivity and percapita GDP in a country that does grow at the frontier rate, relative to any other country that grows at the same rate.
Club-convergence by itself implies that there will be a fanning out of the crosscountry productivity distribution, with an ever growing proportional difference between productivity in the converging countries as a whole and productivity in any diverging country. But the fact that introducing modern R&D creates a further separation of countries within the converging group, between those doing R&D and those still doing implementation, induces an even broader fanning out, at least during the transition to the new steady state, with an increase in the proportional difference between productivity in countries doing R&D and in those doing implementation.
To see this more formally, suppose that the leader country has the highest normalized productivity before the introduction of R&D, and define any country's "relative productivity" r t as the ratio of its normalized productivity to that of the leader: a t րa 1 t . Note that, from Proposition 1, Equation (23) and the fact that g′/g * ϭ µ′/µ, therefore the introduction of modern R&D raises the long-run normalized productivity of each country in group 1 by the same factor ((1 ϩ g′)ր(1 ϩ g * ) ). However, as Figure 4 shows, the introduction of modern R&D reduces the normalized productivity of each country in group 2. Since the leader is by assumption in group 1, it follows that for any country in group 1 the limiting value r * of r t will be the same before and after the introduction of modern R&D, while for any country in group 2, r * will be lower after the introduction of modern R&D than it was before.
If we assumed further that educational attainment was the same in each country then the critical value a c would be the same in each country, which would imply that the introduction of modern R&D causes the distribution of long-run relative productivities r * to widen even within the converging countries, falling in the countries where it was below a c /a 1* (group 2) and remaining unchanged in countries where it was above a c /a 1* (group 1), where a 1* is the original steady-state normalized productivity of the leader. A fortiori, if educational attainment was systematically higher in countries with higher productivity then the same widening would take place within the converging countries. The only way in which the dispersion of relative productivities within the converging countries could be reduced by the introduction of modern R&D would be if, counterfactually, there was a large systematic negative crosscountry correlation between educational attainment and productivity. Thus, we have:
Proposition 5 Of course Propositions 3-5 assume that all parameters remain unchanged following the introduction of R&D, whereas in fact the increase in global growth might well induce a country to change some of the policy parameters determining its relative position, especially the educational parameter ξ that determines whether or not it can join the leading convergence group. Notice, however, that a country that leaves its policies unchanged will still be better off in the long run as a result of the increased global growth rate, even if the country is in the last group. That is, although a country in group 3 stagnates relative to the frontier, it will nevertheless have a higher growth rate than if R&D had never been introduced because, by assumption µ (its new long-run growth rate) exceeds g * (its old long-run growth rate).
WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY FOR LAGGING ECONOMIES
For countries that are not sufficiently competitive or do not have a sufficiently good knowledge system when R&D is introduced, there may be only a finite period of time-a window of opportunity-for the country to carry out the needed changes to improve its parameters so as to make R&D viable. After this, the erosion of its absorptive capacity induced by technological advance in the leading country will trap the lagging country in implementation or stagnation.
For example, consider a country whose competitiveness is the same as the one depicted in Figure 3 above, but whose educational attainment ξ is so low that the critical value a c ϭ γ/ξ is higher than the initial steady state a * shown in the figure but lower than a′ R . Then, as we have seen, if this country does not change its competitiveness or its educational attainment it will descend into an implementation or stagnation steady state. If it were to quickly raise its level of educational attainment to that of the country originally depicted in Figure 3 then it would instead go to an R&D steady state. But if it waited until its normalized productivity had fallen below the value of a c shown in Figure 3 then it would continue its descent into implementation or stagnation. Thus, we have: These results illustrate the importance of historically given initial conditions. A country that starts far enough behind one of the world's leading countries may not be able to attain the same productivity level even if it adopts exactly the same policies and institutions as the leading country. Instead it may have to do even better than the leading country in order to overcome the initial disadvantage of backwardness by building up its absorptive capacity.
Present Day Windows of Opportunity
The history of the industrialization and development of several countries, among them Denmark, Sweden, Italy, Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Ireland has been characterized by periods of high, sustained growth sometimes called miracle growth. Other countries, including Argentina, India, Nigeria, Brazil, and Mexico have experienced long periods of sustained economic growth but then failed to reach the status of full development (see Pipitone, 1995 for a historical discussion of the first five and last four cases). These different phenomena may result from technological windows of opportunity that open up and then close at various times. We give an explanation of how this might occur.
The leading edge technological level Ā tϩ1 represents a mix of technologies. During the history of technological growth there has been a sequence of dominant or even general purpose technologies, such as the steam engine, electricity, trains, automobiles, telecommunication, plastics, chemical technologies, information, etc. These have different characteristic innovation productivities for implementation and R&D and different human capital requirement for R&D. Thus, the parameters λ, λ′, and γ may shift over time, reflecting medium-to long-term changes in these productivities and requirements as the dominant technologies change. For example, technologies requiring for their implementation a higher level of skills for a larger proportion of the population in effect require a higher human capital threshold level.
What this means is that the critical values for the existence of a low-technology trap may change. If implementation becomes relatively easier, the trap may disappear for countries with better scientific institutions and parameters for growth. To the extent that they increase the world growth rate g t (of Ā t ), however, their success may strengthen the implementation trap for other countries, which will not experience the window of opportunity.
If a country is originally performing implementation and the opportunity appears to transit to the higher equilibrium (because changes in parameters have led to the disappearance of the low technology trap by raising a′ I above a c ), it will first continue implementing and then begin innovating, a well-known pattern in the case of, for example, the Asian growth miracles. Bloom and Williamson (1998) show how growth in these countries coincided with a demographic window of opportunity in which a lower dependency ratio increased the saving rate. Our model provides a reason why not all countries reaching the demographic window of opportunity will develop: they might not find themselves in a position to reach the high technology steady state.
Similarly, the advent of a new technology for which implementation is more difficult may push some countries into stagnation, by making implementation unprofitable (lowering µ below g′). Alternatively, the exhaustion of the easy part of a new technology may close a transition window that may have been open, by shifting the threshold levels necessary for R&D. A whole set of countries could experience a period of sustained growth followed by a period of low growth.
Although the competition of ideas is enough for miracles in some countries to diminish the opportunity for miracles in others, trade in the products which are the subject of technological advance probably strengthens this effect, by discouraging production and innovation in less prepared countries in precisely those technologies which more prepared countries are using to grow. According to our model, the emergence of Asia, together with the arrival of the general purpose information technologies, could be contributing factors for the lost decades of growth in Latin America, and its consequent permanence in an implementation equilibrium, and for the permanence of Africa in a stagnation equilibrium. Maloney (2002) has used this framework to compare the development of Latin America with countries such as Australia, Sweden, and Finland, finding that deficient human capital accumulation determining technological capabilities may have played a role in its failure to develop.
CONCLUSIONS
We model skill acquisition and technological dynamics when technology investment can take the form of modern R&D or technological implementation. This dichotomy, kept alive by the ever larger skill-level necessary for R&D, gives rise to three convergence clubs, characterized, respectively, by R&D, implementation, and stagnation. Applied to the origin of 20th Century growth, the model explains the simultaneous emergence of large income inequalities between countries. It also implies that after an initial widening of the distribution the most advanced countries (not just those that perform leading-edge R&D) should converge to parallel growth paths, in line with the empirical findings of the convergence literature. Technology transfer is powerful enough to bring about this degree of convergence between the R&D and implementation clubs, but it is not powerful enough to overcome the erosion of absorptive capacity causing divergence between the stagnation club and others. Once R&D takes off, the erosion of absorptive capacity in laggard countries implies that only a finite window of opportunity may exist for them to improve their effectiveness at innovation and knowledge systems so as to join the leading countries in development.
It remains to incorporate physical capital accumulation into the analysis, and to see what difference the degree of capital mobility makes. Our preliminary analysis suggests that the results are robust to capital accumulation. It also suggests that capital mobility tends to amplify the disadvantage of backwardness that is central to our analysis. That is, capital tends to move away from technologically more backward areas and toward the frontier; through a scale effect this reduces the incentive to innovate in the laggard country, causing it to fall even further behind the leader technologically.
The model is consistent with a highly demanding set of facts pertaining to the current distribution of income and factors of production among countries. It explains why economic miracles are possible in modern-day windows of opportunity for development and also why whole sets of countries may be simultaneously afflicted with prolonged periods of slow economic growth when technological implementation becomes more difficult.
The model is also consistent with the results obtained by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) . In their study, a mortality variable constructed for the colonial era serves as an instrument for modern institutions, explaining a substantial proportion of modern differences in income. The authors argue that early settler mortality was among the determinants of the characteristics of colonial states, ranging from extractive states to "Neo-Europes" (Crosby 1986) , that this status determined their early institutions, especially with regard to property rights and checks against government power, that the institutions have persisted over time, and that the persistent institutions continue to affect economic growth. We provide an alternative interpretation of their results, which does not rely upon an unexplained persistence of institutions. By their reasoning, colonial mortality and early institutions can be expected to be correlated with the country-specific parameters determining which convergence group it joined when modern R&D was introduced, specifically the incentives to save (β) and innovate (φ), the efficiency parameter (ψ) and the effective education level (ξ). The long-term character of these effects results not from institutional persistence but from their effects on human capital and technology dynamics. Our "window of opportunity" result shows that the economic differences caused by colonial experience can persist even if the institutions do not.
Economic policy aimed at fostering growth should stress technological change and skill acquisition. Facilitating technological implementation, opening knowledge flows, fostering knowledge institutions, and promoting human capital investment are key factors for increasing productivity. Once good rates of technological implementation are achieved, well-targeted policies may make it easier to identify and overcome specific thresholds constituting obstacles for technological change, thus dissipating low-technology traps. At an average rate of growth of 2%, only 33 countries lagged less than 50 years behind the U.S. in 1995, while the bottom 73 countries in the World Bank database were more than a century behind. Perhaps the appropriate human capital and technological policies can produce not just parallel economic growth and poverty alleviation but economic miracles.
However, once a country has missed its windows of opportunity, it faces a more difficult task than before, because creating the conditions for an R&D steady state to exist is no longer sufficient for that steady state to be reached. At this point, a "big push" is needed to reverse the erosion of absorptive capacity and to join the leading convergence club. Whether or not a poor country is capable of engineering the push on its own is an interesting and important open question.
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